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In what sense would a certain concept of the urban 
meet, as Henri Lefebvre asserted some thirty-five 
years ago, a ‘theoretical need’? What forms of cross-
cultural and cross-disciplinary ‘generality’ would be at 
stake here? And if this is indeed, as Lefebvre always 
insisted, a question of a necessary ‘elaboration, a 
search, a conceptual formulation’, what might a critical 
philosophy have to tell us, today, about what kind of 
concept ‘the urban’ is?1
Even as professional philosophy has never seemed 
so alienated from such questions, the unfolding social 
and spatial reality that provokes them appears, at the 
most basic level, more obvious and urgent than ever. 
For the first time, around 50 per cent of the world’s 
population now inhabit what is conventionally defined 
as urban space – more than the entire global population 
in 1950. Within the next few years, there are expected 
to be at least twenty mega-cities with populations 
exceeding 10 million, located in all areas of the globe. 
Since 1950, nearly two-thirds of the planet’s popula-
tion growth has been absorbed by cities. By 2020 the 
total rural population will almost certainly begin to 
fall, meaning that all future population growth will, 
effectively, be an urban phenomenon. The pace of this 
process can hardly be overestimated, both in general 
and in particular terms. Lagos, for example, which had 
in 1950 a total population of 300,000, today has one of 
10 million. At the same time, this staggeringly rapid 
development also entails new forms of urbanization, 
whether it be the so-called urban ‘corridors’ of the 
Pearl river and Yangtze river deltas, the proliferating 
slums of sub-Saharan Africa, or the eighty coastal 
miles of holiday homes and leisure resorts around 
Malaga, which, it has been suggested, may well be the 
foundation for a future megalopolis. To the extent that 
this indicates an emergent global society in which, as 
Lefebvre speculated, ‘the urban problematic becomes 
predominant’, such a condition involves, then, not 
only quantitative expansion, but also qualitative shifts 
– transformations within the relations between urban 
and rural, as well as, with increasing importance, 
within and between different urban forms and pro-
cesses of urbanization and the heterogenous forces 
which generate them. The potential generalization of 
social, cultural and technological productive logics 
at a planetary scale, and the ‘concrete’ networks of 
exchange and interaction that increasingly bind non-
contiguous urban spaces together within the differen-
tial unity of a global economy, open up a historically 
new set of relations between universal and particular, 
concentration and dispersal, that clearly demand new 
conceptions of mediation. 
If this does indeed suggest a certain ‘theoretical 
need’, then, in one sense, we are of course hardly 
short of ‘theories’ of the urban. ‘The beginning of 
the twenty-first century’ is, as the editors of one of an 
increasing number of urban studies ‘readers’ put it, 
‘an exciting time for those wanting to understand the 
city.’2 Certainly the sociological context of a dominant 
urbanist–technocratic positivism after World War II, 
into which Lefebvre made his initial intervention, 
seems increasingly distant, as much because its his-
torical connection to state apparatuses themselves was 
rendered progressively marginal by emergent forms of 
capitalist development, as because it was discredited 
within the intellectual arena. While, under changed 
circumstances, the empirical sociological literature 
on cities continues to grow, it is now accompanied 
by a rather different vision of urban studies, formed 
out of a resurgent interest in the work of writers such 
as Benjamin and Kracauer, as well as the situation-
ists and Lefebvre himself. Weighty academic studies 
of the city’s historical development fill the pages of 
publishers’ catalogues, alongside ‘biographies’, gothic 
‘secret guides’ and picaresque cultural histories of 
major urban centres, such as Paris, London, New York, 
LA. At the same time, this contemporary predomi-
nance of the ‘urban problematic’ has helped, within 
the recent conflict of the faculties, to accord a new 
general theoretical significance, and political valency, 
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to specific bodies of knowledge, particularly geography 
– as subject to a disciplinary reconstruction by the 
writings of David Harvey, Neil Smith and others – as 
well as promoting a renewed interest in architecture, 
and architectural theory, as offering a privileged access 
to the distinctive features of our present era, from 
within the sphere of cultural production. Much of the 
work of Fredric Jameson since the early 1980s might, 
for instance, be thought as forming, and being formed 
by, such a theoretical conjuncture. 
This has helped to foster a broader shift in a 
Marxist-inspired political culture. If the ‘urban’ scarcely 
appears as a specific thematic within the canonical 
works of Marx and Engels themselves, after the late 
1840s at any rate, with the various twentieth-century 
movements of ‘actually existing socialism’ this vacuum 
tended to be filled by a series of profoundly anti-
urban conceptions concerning the social and spatial 
conditions of political struggle. The city, Régis Debray 
quotes Castro as saying, is ‘a cemetery of revolutionar-
ies and resources’ – a political judgement which runs 
throughout Maoist, Cuban and other Latin American 
models of social struggle and division.3 Albeit in a 
more complex form, and despite the various urbanist 
and architectural experiments of the early metropolitan 
avant-gardes, this is arguably also true of the Soviet 
model, which maintained from the beginning an essen-
tial suspicion towards metropolitan development. In 
much Western Marxist theory, this judgement took 
a connected form in arguments about the primacy of 
industrialization and the factory – over any relatively 
autonomous processes of urbanization – within the 
‘laws of motion’ of capitalist development, as well as in 
the composition of the proletariat as a force opposing 
it. Manuel Castells’s early Althusserian approach to 
the ‘Urban Question’ (in 1977) could be understood 
as a structuralist summation of this by-then-classical 
‘orthodox’ position developed in explicit opposition to 
Lefebvre’s supposed ‘fetishization’ of urban revolution 
in the wake of 1968 and his reconsiderations of the 
revolutionary form of the Paris Commune.4
Castells has, of course, in his own distinctive way, 
come a long way since then – effectively passing back 
through Lefebvre and out the other side. But, more 
generally, the last couple of decades have accorded 
a new significance to the role of urbanization within 
contemporary forms of capital accumulation. This has 
brought to the fore a new series of socio-economic 
questions, concerning for example real-estate specula-
tion, monopoly rent and finance capital, and their rela-
tion to an orthodox Marxist theory of value. As such, it 
has promoted a renewed focus on the role of the logics 
of production, and of the social relations, specific to 
urbanization – as logics that are not reducible to the 
‘industrial’ – and their connection to the contemporary 
spatial structuration of increasingly globalized flows 
of money, information and people. Once seemingly 
something of a minor stock option in the academic 
marketplace, the ‘urban’ appears today as a central 
concern across the entirety of the humanities and 
social sciences; even, perhaps, as one of the speculative 
horizons of their transdisciplinary convergence. 
It is the broader theoretical and political questions 
raised by this convergence to which the following 
series of remarks are addressed. They seek to indicate 
a need for a wider critical reflection upon the spe-
cific trans-disciplinary terms of a developing ‘urban 
studies’; in particular, a reflection upon the conceptual 
character of the different ‘figures’ through which the 
socio-historical and spatial specificity of contemporary 
urban form has come to be articulated in and across 
the various fields in which it is engaged. For, as 
Lefebvre saw, if the urban phenomenon is indeed ‘uni-
versal’ – that is, ‘a global reality’ – the problem of the 
urban raises, in a particularly urgent way, the question 
of the forms of universality at stake in contemporary 
critical theory more generally, as well as its relations 
to more specialized knowledges and forms of cultural 
particularity. 
While a thinking of these processes needs to 
direct its focus upon the systematic character of the 
contemporary planetary urban problematic, such a 
project could, I want to suggest, still find its compass 
in its theoretical beginnings, in a re-reading of two 
canonical thinkers of urban form: Lefebvre himself 
and Georg Simmel. For it is, relatively uniquely, if 
in markedly different ways, to Lefebvre and Simmel 
that we owe a largely undeveloped task of thinking 
together something like a philosophical concept of 
the urban with a historical account of its emergent 
spatial and social forms. An adequate elaboration of 
this task is beyond the scope of this article. However, 
I want instead to pursue a more modest prolegomenon 
to it: a brief, and necessarily schematic, interrogation 
of a particular historical concept of urban form – the 
metropolis – which has played a persistent role within 
certain cross-disciplinary discourses of modern social 
space and spatial experience. This risks the accusation 
of a certain anachronism, for much weight of current 
opinion would suggest, not without justification, that the 
metropolis is a form of the urban that is in the process 
of becoming historically surpassed in an age of the 
so-called network society. Nonetheless, whatever the 
truth of this – which is perhaps more complicated than 
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may be supposed – it is precisely the repeated claims 
that the concept of the metropolis has made, histori-
cally, to a certain (ontological and phenomenological) 
universal significance which, I will argue, renders it of 
philosophical interest. Such universality has, in turn, 
made it a key point of theoretical mediation between 
a range of different disciplines, as well as allowing 
for its construction as a kind of ‘privileged figure’ of 
capitalist modernity itself – for art, architectural or 
literary history as much as for social theory – which 
persists from Simmel, Sombart, Benjamin or Meidner 
through to the likes of Rem Koolhaas today.5 
What follows, then, pursues a conceptual geneal-
ogy that seeks to bring out the historical logic of the 
concept of the metropolis. If this is an essentially 
‘philosophical’ procedure, it also opens up onto some 
contemporary political questions, to which I will 
return. First, however, it is necessary to say something 
about the understanding of the ‘philosophical’ that 
is entailed by the ‘need’ for something like a philo-
sophical concept of the urban. This will provide the 
context for my first claim: that the philosophical inter-
est of the concept of metropolis lies in its presentation 
as a determinate negation of the city as a historically 
specific form of the urban. 
Philosophy, the city, the metropolis
Although one would scarcely know it from existing 
commentaries, Lefebvre is surprisingly explicit that, 
in order to ‘take up a radically critical analysis and 
to deepen the urban problematic’, it is philosophy 
that must be ‘the starting point’.6 Yet if urban studies 
appears today as something like an emergent trans- 
or counter-disciplinary discipline in its own right, 
what contribution ‘philosophy’ – as opposed to social 
science or cultural theory, where, by and large, Lefeb-
vre’s work, like that of Simmel, has been most readily 
received – might make to a knowledge of the urban 
is far from obvious. Far from obvious in one sense, 
that is. In another, of course, the basis for such a 
contribution is all too evident, and, as such, potentially 
misleading. For in its classical ‘origins’, philosophy 
itself is very precisely situated in the city (polis). 
Indeed, for Plato, if the ‘object of politics is the unity 
of the city’, then, as Jean-François Pradeau states, ‘the 
knowledge that is suited to that object is philosophy’. 
The city is the point at which Plato’s philosophy as 
a whole converges, and not only in the Republic. 
The ‘destiny of knowledge [of the truth] and that of 
communal [city] life’ are inextricably linked.7 This 
means not only that it is philosophical thought that 
is entrusted with the foundation and government of a 
being-in-common that would constitute ‘the unity of 
one and the same city’, but that there can be no thought 
without the polis. The myth of the ‘philosopher-king’ 
– not an expression to be found in Plato’s oeuvre 
as such – distracts from this more important point. 
Philosophy, in its classical Greek determination, is 
irreducibly urban. Thus, for Aristotle, similarly, man’s 
unique nature as a political animal [politikon zoon] 
– a conception taken up later by Marx, among others 
– translates as he ‘whose nature is to live in a polis’. 
While ‘the association that takes the form of a polis’ 
(he koinonia politike), as the condition of the ‘good 
life’, is determined teleologically – as ‘that for the sake 
of which’ (to hou heneka) man is designed by nature 
– it is philosophical reflection, as well as ‘observation’, 
that is required for the discovery of how this ‘good 
life’ is to be best attained.8 Philosophy must therefore 
take as a central task the elaboration of a definition of 
‘both the city and the knowledge that takes the city as 
its object’.9 
These philosophical discourses of the city cast a long 
and diverse historical shadow, passing through medieval 
theology to Renaissance humanism to Enlightenment 
rationalism (where the idea of ‘urban planning’ as such 
begins)10 and beyond. It is a history which, in various 
forms, modern philosophy has often sought to reclaim, 
even as it disturbs its modern disciplinary identity. Yet, 
as Lefebvre reminds us, such discourses emerge from, 
and acquire their validity only within, the historically 
specific urban form of the polis itself – that distinctive 
spatial and social form of relationality or ‘association’ 
established by what Edward Soja terms the Second 
Urban Revolution, beginning on the alluvial planes 
of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.11 Soja maintains 
that until a Third Urban Revolution constituted by 
‘urban–industrial capitalism’, the city-state form ‘was 
elaborated, diffused, and reinvented all over the world 
with relatively little change in its fundamental spatial 
specificities’. Whether or not one accepts this, if one 
accepts that these ‘spatial specificities’ are not those 
of modern urban form – and that the formation of 
‘philosophy’ itself cannot be disentangled from the 
social relations and divisions of labour within which it 
is (re-)constituted – then clearly one cannot accept that 
this leaves unchanged either philosophy or its relation 
to a definition of ‘both the city and the knowledge 
that takes the city as its object’. It is a recognition of 
its distance from the urban form of the city that is the 
condition of any philosophically critical engagement 
with the modern urban problematic. It is in its capacity 
to mark such a recognition that the historically specific 
concept of metropolis – emergent at the beginning of 
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the nineteenth century, in a form which both draws 
upon its own classical meaning (‘mother-city’) and 
radically diverges from it12 – assumes what I have 
posited as its potential philosophical interest. 
 We can find a basis for this conceptual genealogy in 
the work of the Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari, 
who, beginning with ‘The Dialectics of the Negative 
and the Metropolis’ (1973) – and the remarkable read-
ings of Simmel, Weber, Tonnies, Benjamin and others 
that it contains – has sought precisely to elaborate 
something like a theory of the metropolis, as some-
thing more than mere cultural history.13 As Cacciari 
shows, while each of its great early-twentieth-century 
theorists may ultimately retreat from its most radically 
‘negative’ implications, the ‘image’ of the metropolis 
nonetheless appears repeatedly in their writings in a 
remarkably consistent form:
an uprooting from the limits of the urbs, from the 
social circles dominant within it, from its form – an 
uprooting from the place (as a place of dwelling) 
connected to dwelling. The city ‘departs’ along the 
streets and axes that intersect with its structure. The 
exact opposite of Heidegger’s Holzwege, they lead 
to no place.… The great urban sociologists of the 
early century perfectly understood the uprooting 
significance of the explosive radiating of the city.14
It is as a development of the conceptual form of 
such ‘uprooting’, of the form of the city, and of its 
phenomenological determination of ‘place’, that we 
arrive at the familiar construction of the metropolis 
as allegory or privileged figure of capitalist moder-
nity, the essential ‘site’ of modern experience from 
Baudelaire to Benjamin to Debord. Cacciari is no 
doubt right to locate Simmel’s famous essay, ‘The 
Metropolis and Mental Life’, as the pivotal (certainly 
the most influential) moment in this history. For it is 
a striking aspect of Simmel’s essay that the metropolis 
is conceptually elaborated through a contrast not, as 
one might expect, to rural life, but rather to the life of 
the city in ‘antiquity and in the Middle Ages’. This is 
the basis for a powerful phenomenological account of 
modern social life defined, negatively, in terms of its 
displacement of the ‘restrictions’ that such earlier urban 
forms imposed. If Simmel brings this out most clearly 
and succinctly, such a contrast was not unique among 
his contemporaries. Simmel’s essay was written as a 
lecture prior to the 1903 German Metropolitan Exhibi-
tion in Dresden. Other lectures in the same series, such 
as that by the historian Karl Bücher, similarly stressed, 
as David Frisby has related, a historically specific idea 
of the metropolis as a ‘new urban type … with which 
no earlier form of city compares’, inhabited by a ‘new 
species’. If quantitative growth is important here, it is 
only to the extent that it issues in a qualitative differ-
ence. (Karl Scheffler wrote in 1910: ‘What is absolutely 
decisive for the concept of the modern metropolis is 
not the number of its inhabitants but rather the spirit 
of the metropolis [Grossstadt Geist].’15) 
Part of the rationale for the 1903 exhibition was 
as a counter to a strong anti-metropolitan tendency 
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in turn-of-the-century European culture, which was, 
significantly, not necessarily anti-urban per se. For 
every rural Gemeinschaft, often itself extrapolated into 
ideas of the garden city, we can find a contemporane-
ous vision of the city, as polis or urbs, set against the 
‘new urban type’ of the metropolis. Overcoming ‘the 
negativity of the metropolis’, starting perhaps with 
Simmel himself, means always reducing it again to the 
regressive ‘utopia’ of the city.16 (Patrizia Lombardo, 
for example, points to the exemplary La Cité antique 
of Fustel de Coulanges, as a utopian place ‘beyond 
modern contradictions’; both Cacciari and Manfredo 
Tafuri refer to the later, and apparently more progres-
sive, Deutsche Werkbund, and to an intersection with 
what Lacoue-Labarthe describes as a dream of the 
city itself as ‘a work of art’; the polis as ‘belonging to 
the sphere of techne’.17) To this extent, the concept of 
metropolis can be shown to develop historically, not 
as a simple synonym for the city, and for the ancient 
lineage it designates, but, on the contrary, as the mani-
festation of a distinctively modern spatial-productive 
logic which opposes and unsettles it. As such it only 
‘take[s] shape conceptually [at] the end of a process 
during which the old urban forms … burst apart’.18 It is 
in such historical and conceptual terms that Simmel’s 
essay must be understood. For unlike the later urban 
sociology and history of the Chicago School or Lewis 
Mumford, Simmel’s study is not devoted to a simple 
delineation or aggregation of examples of the urban. 
While his metropolis is, on some level, evidently Berlin 
(just as Lefebvre’s ‘urban society’ is, in some sense, 
Paris), the urban problematic sketched out is one pre-
cisely concerned with the possible articulation, in the 
cultural present, of effectively universal forms of social 
and spatial relationality, and the modes of experience 
produced by such constitutive relations – what Cacciari 
terms the ‘problem of the relation between modern 
existence and its forms’.19 If, then, our reading carries 
us beyond the bounds of Simmel’s own presentation, 
nonetheless we find already there, in the 1903 essay, 
the metropolis as not only a ‘sociological’, but also an 
effectively historico-philosophical concept.
Philosophy, abstraction, urban form
The impossibility of reconstituting an actual ‘phil-
osophy of the city’ implies a need to think further 
about the relation between the historically new ‘con-
ceptual shaping’ of urban form that, for complex 
reasons, the term metropolis came to mark, and the 
modern ‘fate’ of philosophy itself. It is instructive to 
consider, for example, the conceptual form of what 
Robert Ackermann delineates as Wittgenstein’s City 
– a notion which he derives from a famous analogy 
in the Philosophical Investigations:
ask yourself whether our language is complete; 
– whether it was so before the symbolism of chem-
istry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus 
were incorporated into it; for these are, so to speak, 
suburbs of our language. (And how many houses 
or streets does it take before a town begins to be a 
town?) Our language can be seen as an ancient city: 
a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new 
houses, and of houses with additions from various 
periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new 
boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform 
houses.20
Here, the heterogeneity of language games, without 
synthesis, that constitutes modern urban space, meta-
phorically and actually, must evidently be conceived 
in a quite different way from classical philosophy’s 
relation to the polis, which presumes a fundamental 
theoretical unity of knowledge(s) that would found 
and organize the city.21 In one sense, Wittgenstein’s 
city may be read as a simple metaphor for the famil-
iar story of modern philosophy’s progressive loss of 
‘territory’ to the emergent ‘domains’ of the various 
independent sciences – the language games that 
include ‘the symbolism of chemistry and the notation 
of the infinitesimal calculus’, but also the ‘multitude 
of new boroughs’ that are the social sciences. At the 
same time, however, in so far as this entails, among 
other things, the actual question of ‘both the city 
and the knowledge that takes the city as its object’, 
it becomes more than just a metaphor.22 For it raises, 
beyond Wittgenstein’s own conceptions of philosophy’s 
task to survey and order his metaphorical city, the 
philosophical question of the possibility, and possible 
nature, of the interconnectedness of knowledges that 
a theoretically adequate account of the urban would 
presuppose.
It is precisely this question that Lefebvre addresses 
both in The Right to the City (1967) and in one of the 
more theoretical sections of The Urban Revolution. It 
is worth looking quite closely at what he has to say 
here. Beginning with a characteristic Hegelian-Marxist 
assault on an urbanist positivism, and its production 
of a ‘fragmentary’ and uncritical knowledge, Lefebvre 
notes that such positivism ‘present[s] itself as a counter-
weight to classical philosophy’. Nonetheless, as soon as 
it ‘attempts to extend its properties’, it tends always (as 
with ‘linguistic models’) towards an unintended and 
unreflective move from the specializations of ‘science’ 
to the generalities of ‘philosophy’, by virtue of a neces-
sary claim, ‘consciously or not’, upon totality:
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As soon as we insist on … totality, we extend 
classical philosophy by detaching its concepts 
(totality, synthesis) from the contexts and philo-
sophical architectures in which they arose and took 
shape. The same is true for the concepts of system, 
order, disorder, reality and possibility (virtual-
ity), object and subject, determinism and freedom, 
structure and function, form and content … can 
these concepts be separated from their philosophical 
development?23
The issue here is the necessity and ineliminability 
of general concepts, as points of mediation between 
the different language games of specific knowledges.24 
The urban phenomenon, ‘taken as a whole, cannot 
be grasped by any specialised science’.25 Hence the 
‘theoretical need’, if only as the basis for a speculative 
‘hypothesis’ of the whole, for forms of broadly philo-
sophical reflection. For it is philosophy, Lefebvre writes, 
which has, historically, ‘always aimed at totality’. 
This means two things. First, if philosophy remains 
necessary because of the ‘theoretical need’ for total-
ity, nonetheless it cannot return, after the emergence 
of the specialized ‘sciences’, to its previous form 
as a given unity of theoretical knowledge(s). The 
demand for a conceptual elaboration cannot therefore 
be understood as an anachronistic reconstruction of 
classical philosophy’s claim upon the city, but rather 
as the demand for a philosophically reflective form of 
trans-disciplinarity which would maintain a specula-
tive horizon of totality in relation to a theoretical 
knowledge of modern urban form. (Philosophy is, in 
Lefebvre’s terms, reconceived as a project of totality 
which, nonetheless, ‘philosophy as such cannot accom-
plish’.) In Lefebvre’s words, ‘whenever philosophy 
has tried to achieve or realize totality using its own 
resources it has failed … [even as it] supplies this 
scope and vision’.26 Against the compartmentalizations 
of a ‘fragmentary knowledge’ (parcelled up between 
the social sciences and particularist cultural studies 
of the urban), the task becomes one of establishing a 
cross-disciplinary movement which would redeem the 
universalizing movement of philosophical knowledge. 
The second point is that this requires some justifica-
tion for the forms of abstraction that such a project 
of totality entails – against the empiricist demand for 
an immediate turn to the ‘concrete’, embodied by a 
certain urban ‘sociology’. This may well lie in the 
distinctive forms of social abstraction to which, in 
capitalist modernity, such a project itself relates.27 
Let us continue to follow, for the moment, the 
development of Lefebvre’s own argument. If the 
modern urban problematic requires conceptualiza-
tion it is, Lefebvre claims, because it must itself, 
in this theoretically universal sense, be considered, 
first of all, as essentially a question of ‘pure form: a 
space of encounter, assembly, simultaneity’. As such, 
it has, Lefebvre continues, ‘no specific content.… It 
is an abstraction, but unlike a metaphysical entity, 
the urban is a concrete abstraction, associated with 
practice.’28 This apparently paradoxical notion of a 
‘concrete abstraction’ is one that Lefebvre takes, of 
course, from Marx; an ‘inspiration’ which, in relation 
to the broader concept of social space, is elaborated 
further in his best-known book, The Production of 
Space (1974).
In his work preparatory to Capital, Marx was able 
to develop such essential concepts as that of (social) 
labour. Labour has existed in all societies, as have 
representations of it … but only in the eighteenth 
century did the concept itself emerge. Marx shows 
how and why this was so, and then … he proceeds 
to the essential, which is neither a substance nor a 
‘reality’, but rather a form. Initially, and centrally, 
Marx uncovers an (almost) pure form, that of the 
circulation of material goods, or exchange. This is 
a quasi-logical form similar to, and indeed bound 
up with, other ‘pure’ forms (identity and difference, 
equivalence, consistency, reciprocity, recurrence, and 
repetition).… As a concrete abstraction, it is devel-
oped by thought – just as it developed in time and 
space – until it reaches the level of social practice: 
via money, and via labour and its determinants.… 
This kind of development … culminates in the 
notion of surplus value. The pivot, however, remains 
unchanged: by virtue of a dialectical paradox, that 
pivot is a quasi-void, a near-absence – namely the 
form of exchange, which governs social practice.29
Lefebvre is following the movement of Marx’s famous 
methodological introduction to the Grundrisse – itself, 
as is well known, indebted to Hegel’s Science of Logic. 
The articulation of urban form as a concrete abstrac-
tion is modelled here on that ‘kind of development’ of 
the concept which (‘more fruitful than classical deduc-
tion, and suppler than induction or construction’) leads 
from (abstract) thought, via increasing determinants, 
towards the ‘rich totality’ of relations and mediations 
that constitute (concrete) ‘social practice’; ‘whereby 
thought appropriates the concrete, to reproduce it as 
intellectually concrete’.30 In this process, as one recent 
commentator puts it, ‘In its development toward the 
concept, no longer immediate and empirical but con-
ceptualized and determinate, the abstract nevertheless 
subsists as condition of its conceptualisation.’31
However, in Lefebvre’s account, this epistemology 
of concrete abstraction runs into, or even up against 
(as indeed the Grundrisse itself does), a somewhat 
different problematic: that of real (or, ultimately, what 
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Peter Osborne calls actual) abstractions.32 These are 
two different ‘forms’ of abstraction which Lefebvre 
tends to more or less conflate here. If each is derived, 
via Marx, from Hegel’s logic, they are nonetheless not 
identical, nor similarly radical, in their implications for 
a concept of urban form such as Lefebvre demands. 
This is particularly so once such a form is considered in 
relation to its historically specific manifestation within 
capitalist modernity, which I am taking to be named 
by the concept of metropolis. For what are termed 
here real abstractions – an abstraction ‘not merely as 
category but in reality’, as Marx begins to formulate 
it in the Grundrisse – would be neither simply one-
sided intellectual generalizations, nor methodologically 
necessary aspects of an epistemology of concretization, 
but those which, in ‘the specific set of circumstances’ 
of capitalist modernity, come to have an actual objec-
tive social existence, ‘a definite social form’, albeit one 
which ‘pivots’ around a ‘quasi-void’. 
Lefebvre writes: as a ‘pure’ logical form, urban 
form ‘calls for a content and cannot be conceived as 
having no content; but, thanks to abstraction, it is in 
fact conceived of, precisely, as independent of any 
specific content’.33 Perhaps a certain ambiguity in this 
phrase – ‘thanks to abstraction’ – can help us clarify 
something of the distinction between ‘concrete’ and 
‘real’ abstraction. Its most obvious meaning is that 
‘thanks’ to abstraction, as part of a methodological 
process, we can analyse urban space as a ‘pure form’, 
intellectually abstracted from its various, particular 
actual material ‘contents’, but conceptually developed 
in view of a ‘concrete’ whole. Yet, of course, one 
might also say, following Capital, that, in capitalist 
modernity, it is indeed ‘thanks’ to its actual form of 
abstraction that exchange, in its determinate negation 
of the ‘substance’ of use value, is without content, and 
does not ‘determine what is exchanged’. This just is 
the reality of the ‘pure form’ of commodity exchange, 
of the value form and of money, and thus, possibly, of 
its distinctive spatial aspects also. As the value-form 
theorist Christopher Arthur puts it:
There is a void at the heart of capitalism.… What is 
constituted when the heterogenous material features 
of commodities are declared absent from their iden-
tity as ‘values’ is a form of unity of commodities 
lacking pre-given content.… It can only be charac-
terized as form as such, the pure form of exchange-
ability.… It is the form of exchange that is … the 
primary determinant of the capitalist economy rather 
than the content regulated by it.34
This form of exchangeability – when it reaches the 
point of ‘self-valorizing value’ – has no ‘natural limit’ 
(as regards what can be exchanged). As such, its capac-
ity to ‘take on’ any ‘specific content’ itself confirms 
its status, conceptually, as a pure form that actually 
‘governs social practice’.
Lefebvre’s equation of urban form with Marx’s 
‘uncovering’ of the pure form of exchange raises the 
following questions. Like exchange, specifically mon-
etary exchange – which does not, formally, ‘determine 
what is exchanged’ – does the modern urban phenom-
enon have a very particular and very real historically 
determined ‘affinity with logical forms’?35 If so, to 
what degree, and in what sense, might the ‘abstrac-
tion’ of the concept of metropolis be connected to the 
‘abstractness’ of that form (of the urban) to which it is 
related?36 Indeed, would recognition of such abstrac-
tion be a condition of any claim to grasp its general 
(‘concrete’) historical specificity?
Lefebvre himself ultimately steps back from the 
more radical implications of such questions. Indeed, 
he finally comes down on the side of what he takes 
to be the ‘different’ conceptual ‘development’ of the 
Grundrisse over that of Capital: the latter presented 
as ‘impoverishing’ because of its ‘strict formal struc-
ture’ – focused on ‘the quasi-“pure” form’ of value 
– by comparison with the former’s openness to ‘more 
concrete themes’ and ‘more practical conditions’.37 
Yet this clearly risks misunderstanding what is at 
stake in the logic of the ‘formal structure’ of Capital, 
to the extent that it turns around the real abstraction 
of the value form as that which defines the historical 
specificity of capitalism as such. It is not insignifi-
cant, then, that, apparently tracing the developmental 
structure of Marx’s own work, it is the ‘bad abstrac-
tion’ of abstract labour (time), rather than the value 
form, which Lefebvre takes as his starting point for 
the discussion of abstraction through which the key 
concept of ‘abstract space’ is elaborated in The Pro-
duction of Space. Yet, as Arthur points out, it is ‘the 
form of exchange that establishes the necessary social 
synthesis in the first place’.38 It is capital not labour 
that, analytically at least, takes ‘priority’ here. Eliding 
this, Lefebvre seems to try to hold on to a notion of 
abstract space as something like the merely social form 
of appearance of ‘concrete’, ‘lived’ spatial relations of 
production and experience. 
Yet, is it not the case that ‘abstract space’ must itself 
be understood as the condition of that ‘real’ production 
of space – and spatial relations – which is formed, 
above all (if not exclusively), in terms of a production 
for exchange, part of a ‘real subsumption’ to the self-
production of value? If so, a certain abstract form of 
relationality would, in this sense, be abstract space’s 
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real ‘content’ – the condition of a new spatial logic of 
social connectivity and ‘life’ – a ‘common content’ that 
is not ‘pre-given’ (a simple abstraction out of what is 
there), but rather itself a kind of ‘introjection’ of this 
abstract form.39 This perhaps, above all, defines the 
conceptual problematic of the metropolis.
City of money
Nowhere in Lefebvre’s account is Simmel mentioned, 
but there is an obvious point of proximity here to the 
concerns of the 1903 essay. The metropolis, Simmel 
famously writes, is ‘the seat of’, and is ‘dominated’ 
by, ‘the money economy’, defined by its ‘multiplicity 
and concentration of economic exchange’. It is money, 
‘with all its colourlessness and indifference, [which] 
becomes the common denominator of all values [in 
the metropolis]; irreparably it hollows out the core 
of things, their individuality, their specific value, and 
their incomparability. All things float with equal spe-
cific gravity.’40 The metropolis would thus be, for 
Simmel, the historically specific spatial formation of 
‘those differences that, as the measure and calculation 
of value, integrate every phenomenon into the dialectic 
of abstract value’.41 Yet, we should note, in its relation 
to the money economy, the metropolis appears in two 
significantly different ways in Simmel’s account: as 
both its ‘seat’ and as that which is itself ‘dominated’ by 
its form. In the first case, the metropolis is understood 
as something like the ‘material support’ of monetary 
exchange, the primary space ‘in’ which exchange 
happens (takes place). In the second, the metropolis 
designates the general processes by which space itself 
is formed or produced by exchange (in a way which 
takes ‘place’, ‘hollows out’ its ‘specific [use] values’ 
and ‘incomparability’). As Cacciari puts it, Simmel 
finds, in the Metropolis, ‘the general form assumed 
by the process of the rationalization [and abstraction] 
of social relations’.42 While these two relations to the 
money economy are not separable, indeed are in some 
sense mutually conditional, it is the nature of this 
generality which needs to be interrogated. 
Conceptually, then, the metropolis is ‘shaped’, in 
its ‘pure form’, as that which is both constituted by 
and representative of the distinctive (and immanently 
contradictory) forms of real abstraction which inhere in 
the social relations of capitalist modernity. Metropolis 
would be a name for the generalized spatial formation 
of a certain reality of pure forms – the spatial correlate, 
primarily, of monetary exchange’s general mediation 
and production of the social – which, negating the 
urban form of the city, set out on their own logic of 
development. If the metropolis is ‘a quasi-logical form’, 
then, it is so as a form which unites a differential 
whole in which every particular ‘place’ is rendered 
‘equi-valent’ in a universal circulation and exchange. 
It is this that constitutes its affinity with philosophical 
knowledge, as a ‘form’ ‘similar to, and indeed bound 
up with’, as Lefebvre puts it, ‘other “pure” forms 
(identity and difference, equivalence, consistency, 
reciprocity, recurrence, and repetition)’. (Remember, 
it was the logical forms of ‘identity and difference’ 
that already constituted the ‘philosophical’ terrain of 
Plato and Aristotle’s classical dispute over the polis.43) 
Nonetheless, any concept of urban form will always 
be in danger of being reified as a mere empty and 
static formalism without its reciprocal mediation by 
an account of the evolving spatial and socio-historical 
processes through which such form is reproduced. 
Hence, the necessity of a transdisciplinarity in the 
formation of a ‘project of totality’, which philosophy 
itself cannot accomplish, reliant on the collaborative 
intersection of a range of forms of knowledge, which 
would seek to trace the intersectional relations of the 
metropolis itself.44
If therefore the metropolis presents itself as a form 
of (real) abstraction, and is only ‘unified’ as such, it still 
only attains ‘real existence’, and thus both specific and 
variable ‘form’ and ‘content’ – as, in principle, does 
any social space – by virtue of the spatial production 
of its open and dispersed totality of specific material 
assemblages, its particular ‘bunches or clusters of rela-
tionships’, its own multiple transactions and contacts, 
which are in themselves highly differentiated, if always 
related to its general form.45 Indeed, without these it 
has no concrete form or determinate ‘meaning’ at all. 
But, by contrast to the earlier forms of what Lefebvre 
terms ‘absolute’ and ‘historical’ space – in which, 
as in the polis, the ‘incomparability’ of the intrinsic 
qualities of certain sites remains essential – ‘specific 
values’ are no longer, in themselves, definitive of the 
urban as such, but are constitutively mediated by a 
pure form of exchangeability. Phenomenologically, 
if the metropolis has a universal ‘content’ it is what 
Cacciari calls ‘non-dwelling’, the ‘content’ of a struc-
ture of historical experience in which ‘dwelling’ – that 
great Heideggerian thematic – appears only as ‘absent 
form’ a nostalgic projection of irrecoverable ‘value’ 
and belonging. A sober and lucid analysis of the 
‘problem of the relation between modern existence and 
its forms’, could only be constructed at the level of a 
‘universal’ mediation of the irreducible phenomeno-
logical actuality of abstraction in the metropolis, and 
thus of its historical formation of social-spatial life 
and subjectivity.46
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In its standard appropriation by cultural, literary 
and art theory, the tendency has been to mine Simmel’s 
essay for a kind of impressionistic historicist typology 
of urban phenomena: the blasé type, urbane intellec-
tualism, and so on. Yet, in the systematic network of 
relations that constitute the essay itself, these precisely 
make sense as multifarious, and often conflictual, 
aspects of a logic of abstraction which they cannot 
exhaust. As with, say, Benjamin’s account of the 
flâneur, elaborated in relation to nineteenth-century 
Paris, there is thus something inherently problematic 
about an attempt to locate such types, in isolation, as 
definitive of the metropolis as such. (This is even more 
obviously the case once we address the issue of the 
heterogeneity of emergent non-Western forms of metro-
politan urbanization, and their relation to European or 
North American forms. The urban has never, of course, 
been an exclusively – or even dominantly – Western 
form.) As concept, the metropolis is articulable only as 
a dynamic technical system of relations or references, 
of connectivity, and of production. It is this that is 
approached through the different, precisely formal, 
cross-disciplinary figures of metropolitan organization 
and social-spatial relations; common figures that we 
find in Lefebvre and Simmel, as in Benjamin, and 
others: assemblage, ensemble, collage, constellation, 
web, network, and so on. It goes without saying that 
the currency of such figures must now be thought in 
relation to the changing nature of the social and spatial 
relations within which the tendencies of contemporary 
global urbanization unfolds. One would need to think 
here, for example, of the extent to which the current 
hegemonic figure of the network – ‘today we see net-
works everywhere’, write Hardt and Negri47 – and its 
own claim to the conceptual mediation of an emergent 
social totality, may or may not be understood to mark 
the effective extension of a metropolitan productive 
logic, as Cacciari suggests: the simultaneous joining 
up of ‘juxtaposed and distant points’ that – no longer 
held (however porously) within the continuous spatial 
totality of more or less discrete metropolises – now 
forms an emergent, immanently differentiated, total 
process of urbanization on a planetary scale.48 
I leave this as an open question here. Certainly, 
in so far as the social space of exchange would now 
seem to encompass (if unevenly) the entire planet – a 
global dimension to the abstractness of the value-form 
which takes further (spatially and phenomenologically) 
the determinate negation of the ‘specific value’ and 
‘incomparability’ of place – it can appear, as acknowl-
edged at the beginning of this article, that the metro-
polis is in the process of being itself negated as the 
contemporary form of the urban, displaced by some 
new logic of spatial production. Hence the profusion of 
new concepts in urban studies which seek to grasp this 
shift; starting, no doubt, with Soja’s ‘Postmetropolis’ 
– the figure, so he claims, of a Fourth Urban Revolu-
tion. Yet, in so far as the concept of metropolis, as pure 
form, already presents itself in relation to a projected 
horizon of absolute (spatial) equi-valence, it does not 
yet seem redundant as regards an adequate knowledge 
of contemporary urban form. If so, it may, however, 
now come to appear in two different (but interrelated) 
ways: on the one hand, as the dispersed ‘elements’ of 
a global interconnected network – a network which is 
constitutive of the particular form and ‘experience’ of 
any particular metropolis49 – and, on the other, as the 
basic, generalized form of that network itself, which is 
thus conceptually shaped as a historically new kind of, 
universally ‘radiated’, ‘virtual metropolis’ (to borrow 
a phrase from Koolhaas).50 Perhaps it is the reciprocal 
play between these different levels, and their ‘quasi-
logical’ forms, that could be said to define, conceptu-
ally, the contemporary global urban problematic. At 
the very least, it seems possible to argue that, as such, 
the metropolis may still productively present itself as a 
kind of shifting ‘hegemonic figure’ – an ongoing point 
of mediation with the most general forms of social 
experience and practice – conceptually homologous 
to the overall tendencies of global urban capitalist 
development.
Value, abstraction and difference
Historically, metropolis names a certain quasi-universal 
structure. If my argument is accepted, it designates, 
more specifically, a ‘real’ spatial form of abstraction 
which is constitutive of particular formations of his-
torical experience. Yet, precisely as such, this provokes 
a question concerning the exact relationship between 
the metropolis and the value-form (as apparently the 
structuring abstraction of capitalist modernity). Is it the 
case, as much of our analysis would seem to suggest, 
that the metropolis is, conceptually and practically, 
necessarily rendered subordinate in such a relation 
– internal to its field, its conditions of possibility, 
nothing more than a ‘specific’ (if especially significant) 
determination of its pure form of exchangeability? Or 
is there some more complex and variant structure of 
determination at stake here?51
There can be little question that it is the socio-
economic processes of capitalist relations of production 
and exchange, dominated by the value-form, that have 
historically constituted, and continue to constitute, 
the metropolis. There is no metropolis without the 
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hegemony of capital. Yet such hegemony is not total 
or complete. For capitalism itself is not reducible 
to the logics of accumulation of capital nor to the 
specific abstraction of the value-form. It is – and the 
same is no less true for modern urban forms – always 
articulated with other, ‘non-capitalist’ social forms 
and relations; indeed it cannot reproduce itself without 
them, even if it must, in turn, reconstitute them in 
new ways. In fact, ‘nowhere’ is this clearer than in the 
contemporary re-formation of the metropolis, which 
is subject to a generalization that would no longer 
restrict its ‘terrain’ to the classical ‘sites’ of Simmel’s 
Berlin, Benjamin’s Paris or Musil’s Vienna, but which 
would ‘incorporate’ the likes of Lagos, Mumbai, São 
Paulo or Kuala Lumpur. One might even suggest, as 
Koolhaas’s collaborator Nanne de Ru does, that while 
‘Europe was once the birthplace of the Metropolis’, 
its future is ‘being defined in the developing world’.52 
Of course, politically, if this is understood as allow-
ing a recourse only to the residual oppositionality 
of so-called pre-capitalist cultural and social forms, 
it will do little more than offer what Tafuri calls a 
‘rearguard’ action, the pretext for a reactive pathos of 
enclave theory, place-creation or the genius loci, and 
thus a failure to confront the ‘truth’ of the metropolis, 
to understand the road historically travelled. Yet if 
the metropolis does indeed present itself as ‘pure 
form’, empty of any specific content (including specific 
political or cultural content), the practical productive 
possibilities of the metropolitan system of connectiv-
ity are not exhausted, in advance, by their abstract 
structuring by the conditions of capital accumulation. 
(Nor are they only ‘opposed’ by what supposedly 
remains of the ‘outmoded’, more ‘concrete’, forms 
which ‘precede’ them.) The forms of relationality 
determined by exchangeability are, at the very least, 
alway themselves subject (in however minor a way) to 
a kind of potential détournement, as the histories of 
urban conflicts, from the Paris Commune onwards, 
suggest. (A church can, in the formal structure of 
universal equi-valence, become a café, an art gallery, 
a set of apartments, a recording studio, or whatever.)
It is a telling sign of the ongoing resonance of the 
problematics associated with any particular concept 
that they should find themselves absorbed into Hardt 
and Negri’s continuing struggle to give substance to 
the idea of the multitude. It is worth noting, then, that 
as well as citing in Multitude ‘the urbanization of 
political struggle and armed conflict in the 1970s’, as 
one key element in ‘the construction of new circuits of 
communication [and] new forms of social collabora-
tion’, Negri, in an essay published in 2002 entitled 
‘The Multitude and the Metropolis’, explicitly toys 
with an idea of what he describes as the ‘internally 
antagonistic’ spatial configuration of the metropolis 
as that which might replace the privileged ‘place’ 
previously accorded to the factory (even as extended 
into Tronti’s ‘social factory’), as the crucial site of both 
social production and conflict.53 
Yet, politically, as well as philosophically, the fore-
going must suggest a certain set of complications 
regarding the nature of this antagonism, as well as its 
concomitant new social forms of collaboration, that 
Negri seeks to articulate; just as it does for Lefebvre’s 
influential account of abstraction and the urban. ‘New 
social relationships call for a new space’, Lefebvre 
famously wrote in The Production of Space. And, in 
a classically dialectical formulation, he gave this space 
an equally famous and influential name: differential 
space. Abstract space ‘relates negatively to something 
which it carries within itself and which seeks to 
emerge from it’: the utopian ‘seeds of a new space’ 
harboured by abstract space’s ‘specific contradictions’. 
‘Formal and quantitative’, the ‘bad abstraction’ of 
abstract space is, like abstract labour time, that which 
‘erases distinctions’. The metropolis is thus the ‘site’ 
of a necessary and irreducible conflict:
Today more than ever, the class struggle is inscribed 
in space. Indeed, it is that struggle alone which 
prevents abstract space from taking over the whole 
planet and papering over all differences. Only the 
class struggle has the capacity to differentiate, to 
generate differences which are not intrinsic to eco-
nomic growth qua strategy, ‘logic’ or ‘system’.54
Although Lefebvre’s dialectical formulations are far 
from being Negri’s, it is evidently such a conception of 
conflict to which Negri has turned in his recent work. 
It is the positivity of ‘living labour’, in the figure of 
the multitude, which generates, as ‘creative force’ of 
‘autonomous power’, its oppositional differences and 
multiplicity in the metropolis’s ‘molecular’ antagonistic 
space. Taking up Rem Koolhaas’s (somewhat ambigu-
ous) celebration of what he calls a delirious metropolis 
– but perhaps with an unacknowledged debt also to 
his former collaborator on the journal Contropiano, 
Cacciari – Negri finds there, like Lefebvre, the signs 
of a struggle against the imperial ‘bad abstraction’ of 
abstract space. A hybrid space, the metropolis produces 
new spaces of autonomy which sow the seeds of ‘new 
social relationships’, new modes of cooperation.
One would hardly wish to dispute such a possibil-
ity, nor the recognition of the fundamental forms of 
social division inscribed within contemporary urban 
space that such a vision articulates. Yet, from the 
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perspective of the discussion of abstraction outlined 
above, it provokes some difficult questions (not only for 
Negri and Lefebvre, it should be said, but for pervasive 
postmodern conceptions of a coming cosmopolis also). 
Both Negri and Lefebvre commend themselves here 
because they are relatively free of what has been a 
historically all too common leftist nostalgia for the 
social forms of village, town or city. Each knows that 
the logic of the metropolis cannot simply be evaded, 
only actively and productively engaged. Nonetheless, 
despite this, each also still seems tied to a futurally 
projected idea of difference that would somehow lie 
beyond abstraction per se. Differential space, Lefebvre 
writes,
accentuates differences … [but it] also restore[s] 
unity to what abstract space breaks up – to the 
functions, elements and moments of social practice. 
It will put an end to those localizations which 
shatter the integrity of the individual body, the 
social body, the corpus of human needs, and the 
corpus of knowledge. By contrast, it will distinguish 
what abstract space tends to identify.55
It is as such, for Lefebvre, that differential space 
relates to the negativity of abstraction. Yet, would 
not a certain abstract space be itself the condition, or 
indeed necessary form, of such a differential space?56 
Indeed, without certain structures and experiences 
of abstraction would any such space of a differential 
connectivity or social ‘unity’ be conceivable at all? 
This seems a particularly pertinent question in the 
context of contemporary urban form. It suggests that 
the received opposition between the ‘abstract’ and 
‘concrete’ needs rethinking at this point. For abstract 
space is itself also a positive ‘site’ of the production 
of experience, constitutive of new ‘concrete’ forms 
of spatial relationality generative of social meaning. 
It is not simply, as is implied in much reception 
of Lefebvre’s work, a mere representational form of 
conceptual masking or misrecognition of some under-
lying and unchanging ‘content’ of a real, multiple 
and concrete ‘lived experience’.57 In the metropolis, 
Simmel writes, what appears in spatial relations and 
experience ‘directly as dissociation is in reality only 
one of its elemental forms of socialization’.58 Such 
is the specifically metropolitan negative dialectic of 
capitalist modernity, which, indeed, constitutes the 
urbane form of Simmel’s essay itself, and of its own 
definitively unreconcilable antinomies. 
In this sense, politically, one might wonder whether 
it is, today, less a simple question of ‘difference’ 
versus ‘abstraction’ – the lineaments of an eminently 
deconstructable binary opposition – than one of 
whether it is possible to conceive of an alternate 
relationship between difference and abstraction than 
that constituted by the value-form. If so, how then 
can we conceive today what the World Charter of 
the Rights to the City, drawn up at the Social Forum 
of the Americas in 2004, posits as the potential of 
the urban? As the charter acknowledges, if the social 
divisions of the metropolis favour ‘the emergence of 
urban conflict’, its contemporary formations also mean 
that this is ‘usually fragmented and incapable of pro-
ducing significant change in the current development 
models’.59 As a recent UN–Habitat report on ‘human 
settlements’ shows, contemporary global urbanization 
is dominated by the spatial spread of what it defines as 
slums, in which nearly one billion people – approach-
ing 32 per cent of the global urban population – now 
live. In sub-Saharan Africa the proportion is closer 
to 72 per cent. The overall figure may well double 
within thirty years. Worldwide, poverty is becom-
ing urbanized.60 Such development continues to be 
overdetermined by the distinctive and contradictory 
modes of abstraction of the value form, but according 
to spatial logics that are no longer those of the early 
twentieth century. 
In 1848 Marx saw ‘enormous cities’ as one form of 
relationality in which the proletariat’s strength would 
grow and it could feel ‘that strength more’.61 Yet, 
as Mike Davis notes in a recent article, the newly 
expanding urban population of the ‘developing world’, 
‘massively concentrated in a shanty-town world’, lacks 
anything like the ‘strategic economic power of social-
ized labour’. Struggles here tend to be ‘episodic and 
discontinuous’, reflecting a reconfiguration of the 
‘local’ itself as fugitive, transitory and migrant.62 What 
possibilities of emancipation might emerge through 
such new metropolitan forms of relationality and inter-
connectedness remains opaque and unpredictable. Yet 
it is, finally, in an attempt to elaborate these that the 
concept of the metropolis must meet its real theoretical 
need.
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